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Terror and Race 
Girardeau A. Spann* 
I. INTRODUCfION 
The United States is now engaged in an internationally promi-
nent war on terror. That war, however, is being waged in a way that 
threatens to cause the same types of harm to the democratic values of 
the United States that the Nation's terrorist enemies are hoping to 
inflict. Foreign terrorists are attempting to undermine the fundamen-
tal liberties that United States culture claims to hold dear. But those 
are the same liberties that our own government has asked us to forego 
in its effort to win the war on terror. The paradoxical irony entailed in 
the United States government's demand that its own citizens oblige 
the terrorists by voluntarily incurring these self-inflicted injuries sug-
gests that the terrorists may be operating at a more sophisticated level 
in their external culture wars than is typically understood. However, 
any terrorist strategy of enlisting the United States government as an 
unwitting agent for the infliction of domestic oppression is unlikely to 
succeed. That is because the United States also operates at a more 
sophisticated level in its internal culture wars than is typically under-
stood. Most citizens of the United States will ultimately not have to 
internalize the burdens on fundamental freedoms that flow from the 
war on terror. Instead, the bulk of those burdens will be diverted to 
racial minorities-just as the bulk of the Nation's other domestic bur-
dens typically are. In this way, racial minorities will be used by the 
majority to reconcile the seemingly divergent liberty and security in-
terests that the war on terror is commonly thought to present. 
Some prominent constitutional scholars, such as Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky, have highlighted the threats to civil liberties posed by 
the George W. Bush Administration's war on terror.1 Other promi-
nent constitutional scholars, such as Professor David Cole, have em-
phasized that ethnic and religious minorities tend to pay a 
disproportionately high share of the costs attendant to the Adminis-
tration's war on terror.2 Liberal scholars, such as Chemerinsky and 
Cole, therefore believe that the federal judiciary should be more vigi-
lant in guarding against the erosion of civil liberties that predictably 
* Copyright © 2005 by Girardeau A. Spann, Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. I would like to thank James Forman, Steven Goldberg, Lisa Heinzerling, and Louis 
M. Seidman for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this article. 
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 
1 (2005) (discussing threats to civil liberties); see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE 
STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1-14 (2003) (same). 
2. See COLE, supra note 1, at 1-14 (arguing that non-citizen Arab and Muslim foreign na-
tionals tend to be the ones whose civil liberties are disproportionately curtailed by the war on 
terror). 
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occurs in times of threat to our national security. They also believe 
that the various players in our democratic governmental process 
should guard against the natural inclination to impose discriminatory 
burdens on the liberty of unpopular minorities as a way of advancing 
the perceived security of the majority.3 However, more skeptical 
commentators, such as myself, believe that the present sacrifice of mi-
nority liberty for majority security is simply a form of racial discrimi-
nation. As such, it is an inevitable feature of United States liberalism 
that cannot be prevented through heightened judicial vigilance or en-
hanced democratic attentiveness. The Nation's history suggests that 
the sacrifice of racial minority interests for majoritarian gain is simply 
a defining characteristic of United States culture. Moreover, a realis-
tic process by which the culture could surmount that form of en-
trenched racial inequality is presently unimaginable. The most that 
can realistically be imagined is a renewed national commitment to the 
culture's incremental efforts at palliative care. But that will do more 
to make the majority feel better about its racially discriminatory incli-
nations than it will to curtail the pervasiveness of those inclinations. 
The available evidence suggests that racial discrimination, such as that 
which characterizes the United States war on terror, is a structural 
feature of United States culture that will remain with us for the fore-
seeable future. 
Part II of this article discusses the relationship between terrorism 
and loss of liberty. Part ILA argues that the deprivation of liberty 
constitutes the essence of terrorism. Part II.B argues that the United 
States war on terror ironically entails a similar deprivation of liberty, 
both for the foreign targets of that war, and for the domestic residents 
whose liberty that war is supposed to protect. Part III argues that 
racial minorities are the ones who end up internalizing the depriva-
tions of liberty that are caused by the war on terror. Part lILA de-
scribes how this loss of liberty has been diverted from the majority to 
racial minorities. Part IILB argues that the sacrifice of racial minority 
rights for majoritarian gain has historically been so endemic in United 
States culture that it is unrealistic to expect democratic attentiveness 
or judicial review to safeguard the liberty of racial minorities. Part IV 
concludes that it is difficult to imagine how such intrinsic racial dis-
crimination could come to an end in the United States as we know it. 
3. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1-3 (objecting to civil liberties violations in the war on 
terror); COLE, supra note 1, at 206-08 (discussing the need to adhere to the rule of law and to 
abandon double standards that treat United States citizens more favorably than foreign 
nationals). 
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II. THE WAR ON TERROR 
The primary goal of terrorist activity directed against Western de-
mocracies, such as the United States, is to undermine the fundamental 
liberties that those societies value most highly. The general sense of 
freedom, self-determination, personal autonomy, and security that 
characterizes liberal culture-which in the United States is sometimes 
referred to as the "American way of life"-is jeopardized by the psy-
chological sense of fear, anxiety, and insecurity that terrorist activity 
produces. However, the United States war on terror also shares this 
feature of terrorism because it too undermines the fundamentalliber-
ties of those whom it affects. It infringes the liberties of unintended 
foreign victims of United States counterterrorism measures. It also 
infringes the liberties of the very domestic United States citizens and 
residents whom the war on terror is intended to protect. 
A. Terrorism and Liberty 
Terrorism is the intentional infliction of violence or turmoil on 
noncombatants. It is motivated by the desire of political or ideologi-
cal actors-who have characteristically lost their capacity for empathy 
with their victims-to convey a message that will have a disruptive 
psychological impact on the intended "audience for terrorism." That 
audience typically consists of a target population, and the desired im-
pact is typically the production of sufficient fear, anxiety, and insecu-
rity to cause the members of that population to be apprehensive about 
engaging in the normal activities of everyday life. A secondary audi-
ence for terrorist activity may consist of potential foreign or domestic 
sympathizers with terrorist causes. The desired impact on those sym-
pathizers may be an increased sense of identity or solidarity with the 
terrorists and their political or ideological objectives.4 
Most terrorism appears to be instrumental in nature. It is in-
tended to prompt the target population to make specific political con-
cessions-such as the removal of military forces, the return of land, or 
the recognition of independent sovereignty.s Other terrorism may be 
motivated more by ideological animosity than by immediate instru-
4. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR 
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 9, 15-19 (1998) [hereinafter HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA) 
(discussing psychological effects of terrorist acts on the "audience for terrorism"); PHILIP B. 
HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 12, 15-16 (2003) 
[hereinafter HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY) (discussing psychological effects 
of terrorism on potential sympathizers); JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY 
RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL xx-xxiv, xxvi, xxviii-xxix, 6-8 (2003) (emphasizing violence directed 
at noncombatants by terrorists who dehumanize, and thereby lose the capacity to empathize 
with, their victims). 
5. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, supra note 4, at 9-12 (discussing political 
motives of terrorists); STERN, supra note 4, at 6-8 (same). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Washburn L.J. 92 2005-2006
92 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 45 
mental objectives.6 This is illustrated by the post-9/ll suggestion of 
President George W. Bush that "they hate us" for "our freedoms,"7 or 
the more plausible suggestion that some fundamentalist cultures dis-
approve of the self-indulgent Western hedonism that is epitomized by 
the "sex, drugs, and rock & roll" metaphor for the United States con-
sumer culture.s 
Whether instrumental or motivated by animosity, terrorism can 
be understood as an effort to increase the costs associated with the 
exercise of fundamental liberties by the target population. When in-
strumental terrorism raises the economic and non-economic costs of 
retaining those liberties enough to outweigh the benefits of continued 
resistance to the political concessions that terrorists seek, the target 
popUlation will have an incentive to accede to at least some of the 
terrorist demands. To the extent that terrorism is motivated by more 
abstract ideological animosity, an increase in the costs of exercising 
fundamental liberties will intensify the harms that terrorists wish to 
inflict on the target population.9 
The governmental leaders of target populations often state that 
they will not yield to terrorist demands, because to do so would invite 
additional acts ,of terrorism, intended to extort additional conces-
sions.1° However, credible terrorist threats can nevertheless prompt 
low-visibility concessions. For example, the United States withdrew 
6. See STERN, supra note 4, at 6-8 (discussing religious and ideological motives of 
terrorists). 
7. See President George W. Bush, Address to a loint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), 
available at http://www.cnn.comJ2oollUS/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ ("Americans are asking 
'Why do they hate us?' They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically 
elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each 
other."). 
8. See STERN, supra note 4, at 5-7 (discussing desire to "purify[ 1 the world" as a terrorist 
motive); cf HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, supra note 4, at xvii-xx, 12 (discussing how 
anger at mainstream United States culture and association with right-wing militias prompted 
Timothy McVeigh to become the central player in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building). 
9. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, supra note 4, at 15-18 (discussing cost-bene-
fit model of terrorism). Terrorism tends to be most destabilizing when directed at target popula-
tions that are sharply divided along political or ideological lines, because government efforts to 
combat terrorism are less likely to be effective if significant segments of the population are 
already disaffected or already support the objectives of the terrorists. See id. at 12-15 (discussing 
effect of divided populations). 
10. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, Taliban Suspected in Killing of 11 Chinese Workers, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2005, at A15, available at 2004 WLNR 5470276 (China will not give in to terrorists); 
Mary Manning, Woman Killed in Terrorist Attack Eulogized in Vegas, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 4, 
2005, at Bl, available at 2005 WLNR 12465337 (Egypt will not give in to terrorists); Susan Milli-
gan, Bush Urges Patience, Long View on Iraq War; Cites 9/11 Lessons, Need to Protect U.S., 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 29,2005, at AI, available at 2005 WLNR 10231479 (President George w. 
Bush insists that the United States will not give in to terrorists); Fiona O'Brien, Italian Prime 
Minister Resolute Despite Slaying; Group Kills Hostage; Berlusconi Vows to Keep Troops in Iraq, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Apr. 15,2004, at A15, available at 2004 WLNR 18403148 (Ital-
ian Prime Minister refuses to give in to terrorists); Neil Young, Make Sure We're Not Next, 
WESTERN MORNING NEWS (U.K.), July 8, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 10747671 (British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair states that the United Kingdom will not give in to terrorists). 
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military forces from Lebanon in response to the 1983 bombing of its 
Marine barracks and sold missiles to Iran in a 1986 effort to secure the 
release of American hostages.ll 
Credible threats to fundamental liberties are perceived as partic-
ularly vivid by civilian populations, especially when they entail the risk 
of random physical violence inflicted at unpredictable times in unpre-
dictable locations. As a result, governmental leaders are under strong 
domestic pressure to take some action to neutralize the anxiety caused 
by terrorist threats. This can give a small number of loosely organized 
terrorists the ability to extract a disproportionately high degree of 
concessions from a government seeking to protect the liberty and per-
sonal security of its citizens. When the magnitude of the terrorist 
threat is further augmented by factors such as persistence, frequency, 
access to domestic soil, access to suicide bombers, or access to weap-
ons of mass destruction, it is likely that the costs to the target popula-
tion of preserving fundamental liberties can be made high enough to 
yield potentially significant concessions.12 
Because terrorism works best when its costs to the target popula-
tion are maximized, it is rational for terrorists to pose threats that are 
as draconian as possible. Terrorists may attempt to do this by threat-
ening to inflict random injury or death on men, women, and children 
who innocently engage in commonplace activities such as shopping, 
going to work, going to school, utilizing mass transit, opening mail, 
ingesting food and water provided for mass consumption, or simply 
living in high-risk locations. By depriving civilian populations of their 
fundamental liberty to engage in such activities, terrorism is widely 
regarded as ruthless, immoral, despicable, and evil. But it is precisely 
those demonic qualities that are most likely to make governments 
modify their policies and political agendas in ways desired by ter-
rorists. The greater the threat to liberty, the greater the perceived 
terror, the more likely the popUlation is to demand remedial action, 
and the more likely the terrorists are to secure concessions. Accord-
ingly, the essence of terrorism is the imposition of high perceived costs 
on the exercise of fundamental liberties. 
B. Liberty and the War on Terror 
Terrorism seems particularly repugnant to residents of the United 
States because it threatens to undermine the liberal autonomy that 
characterizes the American way of life. Moreover, United States cul-
ture has not yet acclimated to acts of terror in the way that some Eu-
11. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, supra note 4, at 15, 17 (discussing reluctance 
to make concessions to terrorist demands, but citing examples of such concessions). 
12. See id. at 15-18 (discussing terrorist leverage). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Washburn L.J. 94 2005-2006
94 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 45 
ropean countries arguably have, because terrorist acts on United 
States soil are still of relatively recent vintage, and their occurrence 
has been of relatively low frequency. As a result, the United States 
has now declared a vigorous war on terror in a stated effort to pre-
serve the liberties that have traditionally been associated with United 
States culture.13 
Ironically, however, the war on terror has itself come to pose a 
threat to the liberal values that underlie the fundamental liberties that 
United States culture values so highly. The war on terror undermines 
the liberty interests of foreign noncombatants who are unintentionally 
injured by United States counterterrorism measures. It also erodes 
the liberty interests of United States citizens and residents who are 
asked to relinquish some of their fundamental liberties in the name of 
national security. Indeed, some have even characterized the war on 
terror as promoting the same "evil" that terrorism itself promotes.14 
1. Foreign Infringements 
The war on terror directly and seriously infringes the liberty in-
terests of foreign noncombatants who are injured or killed as a result 
of the "collateral damage" resulting from United States military ac-
tion directed at suspected terrorists. For example, thousands of non-
combatant civilians have been injured or killed by United States 
ordnance in the post-9/ll military actions that the United States initi-
ated in Afghanistan and Iraq. To date, estimates of civilian casualties 
have exceeded 3,000 in Afghanistan15 and have approached 25,000 in 
Iraq.16 These estimates are imprecise because the pertinent casualty 
13. See Roger Cohen, Freedom's New Ring: War on Terror; Recast Globalist, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., Jan. 22, 2005, at 2, availpble at 2005 WLNR 949691 (discussing President George w. 
Bush's post-9/11 declaration of war on terror); Richard H. Kohn, Four More (War) Years; Can 
He Write a Better Script?, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at B01, available at 2005 WLNR 9619519 
(same). 
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 1-24 (2004) (equating "evils" in terrorism and war on terror); see also Martha Minow, 
What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2134, 2135-36 (2005) (book review of IGNATIEFF, 
supra). 
15. See Barry Bearak et aI., A Nation Challenged: Casualties; Uncertain Toll in the Fog of 
War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at 2002 
WLNR 4060955 (describing estimates ranging from a low of hundreds to a high in the range of 
1,000 to 3,000 civilian casualties in Afghanistan); Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims 
of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting [Revised], Mar. 
2002, available at http://www.cursor.orglstories/civilian_deaths.htm (reporting from 3,000 to 
3,400 civilian casualties in Afghanistan between October 2001 and March 2002). 
16. See Hassan M. Fattah, The Struggle for Iraq: The Tally; Civilian Toll in Iraq Is Placed at 
Nearly 25,000, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A8, available at 2005 WLNR 11332812 (discussing 
statistical survey of civilian deaths in Iraq); see also Iraq Body Count, http://www. 
iraqbodycount.netl (last visited on July 29, 2005) (Internet homepage for Iraq Body Count sur-
vey). Some estimates of civilian casualties in Iraq have been as high as 100,000. See Fattah, 
supra. 
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figures are not officially compiled or maintained by the United 
StatesP 
In a very real sense, foreign civilian casualties are not counted, 
because such casualties appear not to "count" in the United States 
war on terror.18 The United States tends to regard those deaths and 
injuries as inevitable casualties of a war that is necessary to preserve 
United States liberty and security. However, viewed from the per-
spective of those who actually suffer the civilian casualties inflicted by 
the United States in foreign countries, United States military action 
must look very much like the terrorism that is abhorred in this coun-
try. It must appear to be politically motivated violence that is inflicted 
in a largely random manner, in a way that instills widespread fear and 
anxiety so as to undermine the liberty of its victims to engage in the 
normal activities of everyday life.19 
In addition to the civilian casualties produced by United States 
ordnance, there are now credible allegations of torture and prisoner 
abuse conducted by the United States or initiated by United States 
rendition of prisoners to foreign governments. Such torture and abuse 
also interferes in obvious ways with the liberty interests of the foreign 
prisoners who are tortured or abused.20 Moreover, the United States 
now detains such prisoners incommunicado for long periods of time as 
enemy combatants, without charging them with any crime, and with-
out according them the procedural safeguards designed to establish 
innocence or guilt that the United States typically views as compo-
nents of a criminal suspect's fundamental liberty interests. Such de-
tentions are occurring most visibly at the United States military base 
in Guantanamo, Cuba, where the United States claims the right to 
leave the fates of those detainees in the hands of military tribunals.21 
One reason that the United States seems to feel justified in its 
harsh treatment of foreign prisoners is that the United States views 
the terrorists against whom the war on terror is being waged as non-
state enemies who do not honor the obligations of international law, 
thereby freeing the United States from its duty to honor the obliga-
17. See Bearak, supra note 15 (discussing difficulty in obtaining accurate information about 
civilian deaths in Afghanistan); Fattah, supra note 16 (noting lack of definitive account of how 
many civilians have died in Iraq). 
18. Cf Herold, supra note 15 (suggesting that United States military discounts the value of 
Afghan lives). 
19. Cf Jane Wardell, Antiwar Activists Protest Bush Benefit in London, PHILA. INQ., May 
19,2004, at A13, available at 2004 WL 3680723 (reporting London protests in which George W. 
Bush is called a terrorist because of war in Iraq). 
20. See Minow, supra note 14, at 2134-35 (discussing torture and prisoner abuse by United 
States troops); Josh White, Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs; Interrogated Gen-
eral's Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA's Use of Secret Iraqi Squad Are Among Details, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 3, 2005, at AOl, available at 2005 WLNR 12159081 (describing United States military par-
ticipation in prisoner abuse and death in Iraq). 
21. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 8-12 (discussing detention of foreign prisoners); 
COLE, supra note 1, at 39-46 (same). 
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tions of the Geneva Conventions with respect to those prisoners.22 
However, while the United States considers the prisoners that it de-
tains to be "enemy combatants," that designation is made unilaterally 
by the government with little or no judicial review, and many of those 
prisoners claim that they are in fact mere innocent civilians. They fur-
ther claim that they could prove their innocent civilian status if they 
were accorded the procedural safeguards normally accorded criminal 
defendants in the United States,23 
Some people might be inclined to discount the liberty depriva-
tions entailed in the infliction of foreign civilian casualties, or the 
abuse of foreign detainees, precisely because those deprivations are 
suffered by foreigners rather than by United States citizens.24 But 
such a view is at odds with the liberal equality principle that underlies 
the stated commitment of the United States to fundamental liber-
ties.25 Moreover, it also manifests the same dehumanizing lack of em-
pathy that has permitted terrorists to inflict the horrific injuries that 
they have inflicted on innocent civilians in the United States.26 Aside 
from the immediate effect that deprivations of liberty have on foreign 
citizens, the practice of discounting the interests of foreign citizens 
should be troubling inside the United States as well. An essential 
component of the liberties that are at stake in the war on terror is the 
self-perception of the United States as a country that is committed to 
maintaining a fair and just society, rather than a society in which vio-
lence, coercion, and oppression are permitted to flourish whenever it 
is in the Nation's perceived self-interest to look the other way. 
Many foreign victims of the United States war on terror are likely 
to view the United States itself as a practitioner of terrorist acts in its 
infliction of collateral damage.27 That is particularly true with respect 
to the civilian casualties inflicted by the United States in Iraq because 
the weapons of mass destruction and African-uranium justifications 
22. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY, supra note 4, at 10-11 (discuss-
ing expansive view of United States international authority). This view has also caused an ex-
pansion in the United States interpretation of when military action is permitted against foreign 
states who are suspected of supporting or facilitating terrorism. See id. 
23. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 3-8 (discussing lack of safeguards accorded prisoners 
designated "enemy combatants"); COLE, supra note 1, at 39-46 (same). 
24. See, e.g., Herold, supra note 15 (suggesting the United States military discounted the 
value of Afghan lives in its bombing of Afghanistan). 
25. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution states as follows: "No 
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that a tacit equal protection principle 
contained in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause also applies to the federal government. 
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Equal protection principles apply with special 
force where government actions are alleged to burden the exercise of "fundamental interests." 
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 768-84 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing height-
ened judicial scrutiny for fundamental interest equal protection). 
26. See STERN, supra note 4, at xxiii-xxiv, xxviii-xxix (suggesting that terrorists lack empathy 
with victims of their terrorist acts). 
27. Cf Wardell, supra note 19 (reporting accusations of United States terrorism). 
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for those injuries have proved to be false.28 Although the United 
States offers a range of national security justifications for the injuries 
caused by its counterterrorism measures, those justifications are likely 
to be no more persuasive to the foreign noncombatants who suffer 
those injuries than the justifications offered by foreign terrorists are to 
those who suffer injuries inflicted by terrorist acts in the United 
States. Both are likely to be viewed as little more than political or 
ideological rhetoric. The United States arguably lacks the purposeful 
intent to inflict injuries on noncombatants and detainees that is gener-
ally attributed to foreign terrorists, but the distinction between actuat-
ing intent and the deliberate disregard of known effects is likely too 
tenuous a distinction for the victims of United States military action to 
view as analytically coherent.29 
2. Domestic Infringements 
The United States war on terror has also caused the United States 
government to constrain the fundamental liberties of its own citizens 
and residents in order to advance the government's perceived national 
security interest in preventing acts of terrorism on United States soil. 
Among the most notable constraints are those contained in the USA 
Patriot Act (Patriot Act),3° which was quickly signed into law six 
weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World 
Trade Center, without the benefit of public hearings.31 
The Patriot Act adopts a broad definition of terrorist activity that 
includes not only any violation of state or federal law, but also any 
effort to coerce government or civilian populations-seemingly en-
compassing even ordinary political protests, such as civil rights or 
right-to-life demonstrations. Applying this definition, the Act autho-
rizes significant invasions of privacy by permitting the government to 
gather information from entities such as libraries, book stores, and 
28. See Walter Pincus, Prewar Findings Worried Analysts, WASH. POST, May 22, 2005, at 
A26, available at LEXIS, News (discussing inaccuracy of Administration claims concerning Iraqi 
uranium program and weapons of mass destruction). 
29. The Supreme Court has tried to maintain such a distinction in determining what consti-
tutes unconstitutional "intent" for equal protection purposes. Compare Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (requiring intentional discrimination to establish equal protection 
violation), with Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding that mere awareness 
of known discriminatory effects was not sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of the equal 
protection clause). However, the purported distinction between actuating intent and mere toler-
ance of known discriminatory effects cannot withstand meaningful analysis. See GIRARDEAU A. 
SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPO· 
RARY AMERICA 60-66 (1993) (deconstructing supposed distinction between intent and effects). 
30. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter Patriot 
Act] (codified as amended in several titles and scattered sections of U.S.c.). 
31. See COLE, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing adoption of the Patriot Act); cf Chemerinsky, 
supra note 1, at 2 (noting that Attorney General John Ashcroft and the Bush Administration 
rushed Patriot Act proposals to Congress after 9/11 attacks, and noting that Act was passed 
without public hearings). 
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credit card companies without the showing of probable cause that is 
customarily required for law enforcement purposes. Moreover, the 
Act does not allow individuals to be informed that their records have 
been provided to the government. The Act also authorizes expanded 
electronic surveillance of e-mail addresses and Internetwebsites, as 
well as roving wiretaps of any cell phone or other phone that could 
conceivably be used by the target of a government investigation. In 
addition, the Act permits any information acquired under its foreign 
intelligence provisions to be used in domestic criminal proceedings 
not involving terrorism, even though the information was acquired 
without regard to customary Fourth Amendment safeguards.32 
Like the Patriot Act's erosions of privacy, other liberty restric-
tions apply to citizens and non-citizen residents alike. Both are pro-
hibited from providing material support to disfavored organizations, 
at the risk of having their financial assets frozen after secret adminis-
trative proceedings. Attorney General John Ashcroft also expanded 
the scope of FBI guidelines in order to permit greater FBI surveil-
lance of political and religious activities that are not related to crimi-
nallaw enforcement. In addition, new Justice Department guidelines 
now permit the government to monitor traditionally privileged attor-
ney-client communications between prisoners and their lawyers when 
the government suspects a possible connection to broadly-defined ter-
rorist activities or threats.33 
The war on terror has also caused an increase in de facto ethnic 
profiling, directed at individuals who appear to be Arab or Muslim, in 
a way that infringes the liberties of both citizens and non-citizens. Al-
though the government has disclaimed any intent to engage in de jure 
ethnic profiling, most targets of its post-9/11 immigration initiatives 
have been Arab or Muslim. Moreover, the government's de facto eth-
nic profiling has reinforced private ethnic discrimination, such as the 
discrimination that occurs when airlines acquiesce in the prejudices of 
nervous passengers by transferring minority United States citizens to 
alternate flights when their ethnicity causes other passengers to feel 
32. See Chemerinsky. supra note 1, at 14-19 (discussing loss of privacy under the Patriot 
Act); cf COLE, supra note 1, at 57-69 (discussing loss of privacy under the Patriot Act, but 
suggesting that some of the described provisions, such as roving wiretaps and sharing of foreign 
intelligence information with domestic law enforcement officials, do not pose serious civilliber-
ties problems). 
33. See COLE, supra note 1, at 72-82 (discussing restrictions on citizen and non-citizen 
liberties). 
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uncomfortable.34 This phenomenon has been referred to as the prob-
lem of "flying while brown."35 
Some restrictions on liberty apply with special force to resident 
aliens. Massive numbers of United States residents who are foreign 
nationals have apparently been held in indefinite preventive detention 
by the government. They have been detained pretextually for either 
technical immigration violations or as "material witnesses." The gov-
ernment no longer discloses the number of these detainees, but virtu-
ally none have been charged with or convicted of offenses related to 
terrorism.36 United States residents who are foreign nationals are 
subject to a broader definition of terrorism under the Patriot Act than 
are United States citizens. These resident aliens are also subject to 
special sanctions such as deportation and incarceration for political 
speech, associational activities, or the provision of material support to 
disfavored organizations. The Attorney General unilaterally deter-
mines which disfavored organizations trigger the legal prohibitions on 
political association or material support, and those determinations are 
subject to little or no judicial review. Moreover, "material support" 
could include activities that would normally be considered far re-
moved from terrorism, such as the provision of funds to the African 
National Congress to fight apartheid, or the provision of blankets to a 
hospital affiliated with a charity that the Attorney General might 
deem to have terrorist sympathies.37 When judicial review is provided 
under the Act for government determinations affecting the liberty of 
foreign nationals (or United States citizens), those proceedings are 
sometimes held in secret, and sometimes only the government is au-
thorized to appeal from adverse decisions.38 In many Patriot Act pro-
ceedings, therefore, the judicial review on which we typically rely to 
ensure the protection of fundamental liberties is either ephemeral or 
entirely absent. 
The United States government's declaration of a "war" on terror 
has increased the government's self-perceived authority to operate 
militarily on foreign soil and to diminish the liberties of United States 
citizens and residents on domestic soil. Moreover, the current Bush 
Administration has invoked this state of "war" as a justification for 
34. See id. at 47-56 (discussing ethnic profiling). The presence of any real threat to airline 
security is belied by the fact that the airlines simply put the ethnically troubling passengers on 
later flights, without additional security checks. See id. at 47. 
35. See Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Flying While Brown: Must Arab Men Be Racially Pro-
filed?, AMER. PRosPEcr, Nov. 19,2001, at 14 (describing practice of discriminatory removal of 
airline passengers). 
36. See COLE, supra note 1, at 22-46 (discussing use of technical immigration violations and 
material witness status for purposes of preventive detention). 
37. See id. at 57-64 (discussing restrictions on liberty of resident aliens). 
38. See id. at 65-69 (discussing secret judicial proceedings); see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 1, at 2, 17 (same). 
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resisting judicial and congressional efforts to protect fundamental lib-
erties from executive overreaching, and for operating behind a veil of 
secrecy that helps to insulate executive action from oversight by the 
co-ordinate branches of government.39 The rhetorical value of the 
term "war" is that it conveys the idea that some sacrifice of liberty is 
essential for national security, but that the sacrifice will be only tem-
porary in nature-lasting only as long as the duration of hostilities. 
Such "war" rhetoric, however, may be inappropriate in the context of 
terrorism. 
The abridgments of liberty that the Administration favors in the 
name of national security, like the terrorism to which those abridg-
ments respond, seem likely to persist for an indefinite period of time. 
This undercuts any constructive democratic "consent" to restrictions 
on liberty that might otherwise be said to flow from the Administra-
tion's use of "war" rhetoric, suggesting instead that political acquies-
cence in such restrictions may reflect merely a popular misunder-
standing of what is at stake.40 Nevertheless, the Administration seems 
to promote the view that current terrorism problems are temporary 
rather than indefinite in nature by insisting repeatedly that the United 
States will "win" the war on terror.41 
The Administration has tried to reduce political challenges to the 
loss of liberty entailed in its war on terror by questioning the loyalty 
and patriotism of those who oppose the Administration's policies-a 
political move that is captured by the Administration's decision to 
39. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY, supra note 4, at 11, 13, 17 (dis-
cussing claimed expansion of executive power resulting from declaration of "war" on terror). 
40. See id. at xii-xiii, 18 (discussing inappropriateness of "war" rhetoric to justify sacrifice of 
liberties that are likely to be of indefinite duration). As testimony to the likely indefinite dura-
tion of both terrorism and the war on terror, the Bush Administration is presently attempting to 
secure passage of legislation that would make the restrictions on liberty contained in the Patriot 
Act permanent, rather than merely temporary, in nature. See Dan Eggen, Senate Approves Par-
tial Renewal of Patriot Act; Measure Would Limit Search and Seizure Powers, WASH. POST, July 
30,2005, at A03, available at 2005 WLNR 11977714 (discussing efforts to renew expiring provi-
sions of the Patriot Act). 
41. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, House Approves War Funding; 81.4 Billion Exceeds Combat 
Request, Trims Other Plans, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A23, available at LEXIS, News (Pres-
ident Bush emphasizing need to win war on terror); Richard W. Stevenson, The 2004 Campaign: 
The President; Bush Attacks Kerry as Weak on Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A13, avail-
able at 2004 WLNR 4537794 (Bush claiming that his opponent John Kerry would not be able to 
win war on terror). But cf Elisabeth Bumiller, The Republicans: The Convention in New York-
The President; Bush Cites Doubt America Can Win War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at 
AI, available at 2004 WLNR 5537218 (stating that United States might not be able to win the 
war on terror, but could make it less of a world threat). There is at least one hopeful sign that 
the expanding reign of world terrorism will not ultimately prove to be of indefinite duration. 
Recently, the Irish Republican Army declared a cessation of its thirty-year campaign of 
paramilitary terrorism against British rule in Northern Ireland, pledging to continue its struggle 
through political rather than violent means. See Jim Dwyer & Brian Lavery, l.R.A. to Give Up 
Violence in Favor of Political Struggle, American Publisher Says, N.Y. TiMES, July 27, 2005, at 
A12, available at 2005 WLNR 11754738; Glenn Frankel, IRA Says It Will Abandon Violence; 
Shift Follows Decades of N. Ireland Conflict, WASH. POST, July 28, 2005, at AOl, available at 
LEXIS, News. 
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name its primary statute the "USA Patriot Act."42 Moreover, the Ad-
ministration understands that the suggested benefits of heightened se-
curity are likely to be viewed by the public as relatively immediate, 
whereas the costs of the attendant incursions on civil liberties are 
likely to be perceived as more remote. That skews the perceived cost-
benefit balance that the public is asked to strike between liberty and 
security in a way that is likely to promote sympathy for the govern-
ment's counterterrorism proposals.43 This is particularly true when 
one realizes that most United States citizens will not actually have to 
pay the costs entailed in the trade-off between liberty and security 
that the war on terror is said to demand. 
III. TERROR AND RACE 
Instrumental terrorism "works" only to the extent that the politi-
calor ideological concessions demanded by terrorists can be met at a 
cost that is lower than the cost of continued resistance to terrorist de-
mands. As a result, terrorists have an incentive to maximize the costs 
associated with the exercise of fundamental liberties in the cultures 
that they target, and the targeted cultures have an incentive to mini-
mize those costS.44 The self-inflicted loss of domestic liberty that is 
produced by the United States war on terror, therefore, has the ironic 
effect of actually facilitating terrorist objectives by increasing the costs 
inflicted by terrorism. However, to the extent that United States cul-
ture can divert those domestic infringements on fundamental liberties 
so that they are not actually experienced as costs, terrorist objectives 
will be frustrated rather than facilitated. Whether done intentionally 
or subconsciously, the United States has managed to divert to racial 
minorities most of the domestic liberty loss occasioned by the war on 
terror. As a result, the costs associated with that liberty loss are not 
42. See COLE, supra note 1, at 57 (commenting on strategic naming of statute); id. at 208 
(quoting Attorney General Ashcroft's admonition that criticizing loss of liberty, and differential 
treatment accorded citizens and aliens, aids United States enemies and gives pause to its 
friends); Lewis H. Lapham, Buffalo Dances, HARPER'S MAG., May 1, 2004, at 9, available at 2004 
WLNR 11290427 ("The disdain for disloyal or unpatriotic fact defines the Bush Administration's 
approach not only to questions likely to embarrass the oil, weapons, and insurance industries but 
also to those that might interfere with its fanciful conceptions of war and money."); Dale 
Minami, Day of Remembrance Speech, 9 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 36, 41-42 (2004) (discussing sug-
gestion in Bush Administration's "war on dissent" that those who oppose United States 
counterterrorism efforts are disloyal); Helen Tunnah, Muted Protest from a Nation at War, N.Z. 
HERALD, Oct. 14,2004, at B4, available at 2004 WLNR 12453669 ("To criticise the war has been 
deemed unpatriotic, disloyal, uncaring of the thousands who died on September 11. That means 
people have generally stayed off the streets in protest."); cf. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, 
AND SECURITY, supra note 4, at 13-14, 16-17 (commenting on Administration tactic of character-
izing foreign allies as "either with us or against us"); Wolfgang Legien, Thank You America, 
NAVAL FORCES, Jan. 1,2004, at 5, available at 2004 WLNR 15582159 (praising those in United 
States who are willing to criticize Administration policies at risk of being labeled disloyal). 
43. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing 
perceived remoteness of costs associated with loss of liberties). 
44. See id. at 15-18 (discussing cost-benefit model of terrorism). 
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internalized by most United States citizens. The United States, there-
fore, ends up sacrificing the liberty interests of racial minorities in or-
der to benefit the majority. However, such sacrifices are not limited 
to the war on terror. Rather, they have been so common throughout 
the history of the United States that the sacrifice of racial minority 
interests for majoritarian gain appears to be an intrinsic feature of 
United States culture. Although such sacrifices would seem to consti-
tute racial discrimination that directly violates the equal protection 
guarantee of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has consistently tol-
erated this level of "societal discrimination." It has now simply be-
come part and parcel of the very "American way of life" that the 
United States is trying to defend from the terrorist threat. 
A. Diverting the Infringements 
The war on terror is widely regarded as entailing a trade-off be-
tween liberty and security. Although most people in the United 
States report that they are willing to tolerate restrictions on their lib-
erty in order to gain enhanced security, only a small percentage of the 
population reports actually having experienced any significant limita-
tions on their liberty as a result of the war on terror.45 There is a 
reason for this. 
Professor David Cole has described the many ways in which the 
liberty infringements caused by the war on terror have been diverted 
to Arab and Muslim foreign nationals rather than being imposed on 
United States citizens.46 Most of those who are killed, injured, tor-
tured, abused, or whose everyday lives are disrupted by the collateral 
damage inflicted through United States military action are, of course, 
foreign citizens.47 But most of those who suffer domestic restrictions 
on their liberty as a result of the war on terror are also foreign citi-
zens. It is primarily disfavored foreign nationals at whom the war on 
terror directs its domestic harms, including: invasions of privacy; FBI 
surveillance of religious organizations; blacklisting of supposed terror-
ist organizations; unilateral executive designations as "enemy combat-
ants"; incommunicado detentions; pre textual immigration roundups; 
freezing of assets based on secret evidence without hearings; monitor-
ing of attorney-client communications; monitoring of library use; 
monitoring of e-mail; monitoring of Internet use; and de facto ethnic 
profiling.48 Professor Cole points out that it is politically expedient 
45. See COLE, supra note I, at 17-18 (discussing willingness to forego liberties in the name 
of enhanced security). 
46. See id. at 1-21 (describing how foreign nationals have been forced to bear the liberty 
loss produced by the war on terror). 
47. See supra Part II.B.l (discussing foreign infringements of liberty). 
48. See COLE, supra note 1, at 5-6,18 (discussing domestic infringements of liberty); see also 
supra Part II.B.2. 
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for our governmental leaders to divert these liberty infringements to 
foreign nationals because the benefits of such diversions are internal-
ized by citizen constituents who possess political power, while the bur-
dens are imposed on non-citizen foreigners who lack the political 
power to hold governmental leaders accountable for their actions.49 
Indeed, it is precisely this sort of failure of political accountability that 
has created paradigmatic representation-reinforcement defects in the 
democratic process "authorizing" the war on terror.50 
I think that a better way to understand the diversion of liberty 
costs produced by the war on terror is to recognize that diversion as a 
form of classic racial discrimination. The concept of racial discrimina-
tion conveys the invidiousness inherent in the sacrifice of minority lib-
erty for perceived majority security that might otherwise be mistaken 
for a mere convenient and justifiable differentiation based on citizen-
ship.51 Most of the non-citizens who have had their fundamental lib-
erties infringed by the war on terror are Arabs or Muslims.52 
However, it is striking how little public outrage has been generated by 
the targeting of those minority group members in the war on terror.53 
Even established racial minorities-who should know better-seem 
willing to acquiesce in the discriminatory imposition of burdens on 
Arabs and Muslims.54 
Presumably, this lack of public outrage is traceable to the view 
that it is Arabs and Muslims who are primarily responsible for the 
terrorist threat that confronts the United States. But only a tiny frac-
tion of the Arab and Muslim population of the United States has any 
connection with terrorist activities. 55 Therefore, infringing the liber-
ties of all Arabs and Muslims as a counterterrorism measure makes 
about as much sense as interning all Japanese American citizens be-
cause a tiny fraction of them had a connection with World War II sab-
otage activities.56 It is worth remembering that the immediate United 
49. See COLE, supra note 1, at 5-6 (discussing discrimination against those who lack political 
power). 
50. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
135-79 (1980) (elaborating representation reinforcement theory of judicial review). 
51. Professor Cole has noted the racial overtones that have historically accompanied dis-
crimination against aliens in the United States. See COLE, supra note 1, at 88-104. 
52. See id. at 5-7 (discussing Arab and Muslim targets of war on terror); HEYMANN, TER-
RORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY, supra note 4, at 14-15 (same). 
53. See COLE, supra note 1, at 17-24 (arguing that United States citizens have accepted 
restrictions on the liberty of foreign nationals because they have not had to internalize the costs 
of those restrictions). 
54. See Manning Marable, Racism in a Time of Terror, 4 SOULS 1, 11-12 (2002) (discussing 
complex social forces that cause some blacks to acquiesce in post-9/ll discriminatory imposition 
of burdens on Arabs and Muslims). 
55. See COLE, supra note 1, at 6-7 (rhetorically positing that only one-tenth of one percent 
of Arabs and Muslims are involved in terrorist activities). 
56. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944) (upholding World War II 
exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese American citizens); see also id. at 239-41 
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (discussing racial prejudice and internment of Japanese Americans but 
not German or Italian Americans). Commentators have emphasized the disturbing similarities 
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States response to the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City was to blame foreign terrorists, and to adopt anti-
. immigration legislation directed at Arabs and Muslims-even though 
it turned out that those responsible for the bombing were white do-
mestic terrorists.57 Such reflex submission to the lure of stereotypes is 
the hallmark of racial discrimination, and it seems to be a pervasive 
feature of the war on terror. 
One might initially wonder whether discrimination against ethnic 
and religious minorities, such as Arabs and Muslims, should techni-
cally be viewed as "racial" discrimination. As a doctrinal matter, the 
Supreme Court has applied the same strict scrutiny standard of judi-
cial review to discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities as 
it applies to racial minorities. That is because ethnic and religious mi-
norities are often subject to the same sorts of exploitation and invidi-
ous discrimination to which racial minorities are commonly sUbject.58 
More important, however, contemporary United States culture con-
ceptualizes the category of "race" in a way that includes Arabs and 
Muslims. 
that exist between the wartime detention of Japanese Americans that was upheld in Korematsu 
and the summary detentions of Arabs and Muslims now authorized under executive orders, ad-
ministrative agency regulations, and the Patriot Act in our post-9/11 war on terror. See, e.g., 
Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and Na-
tional Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 466-69 (2002) (discussing parallels between post-9/11 racial 
profiling and World War II treatment of Japanese American citizens); Developments in the 
Law-Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1915,1930-39 (2002) (same); Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN 
L.J. 195, 197-200 (2002) (same); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
23,33-39 (2002) (arguing that 9/11 has begun to skew the balance between liberty and security, 
just as the balance was skewed in World War II); Lori Sachs, Comment, September 11, 2001: The 
Constitution During Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715, 1728-35 (2002) (dis-
cussing role of Supreme Court in permitting sacrifice of liberties during World War II); Huong 
Vu, Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security Is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. 
REV. 661, 661-64, 691-93 (2002) (discussing scapegoating of minorities in times of national 
threat); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiter-
rorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2825, 2825-30, 2836-41 (2001) (arguing that modern 
terrorism legislation repeats prior United States 7habit of targeting and stigmatizing immigrants 
and racial minorities). 
57. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, supra note 4, at xvii-xx, 12 (discussing the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building by domestic terrorist 
Timothy McVeigh); Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Dam-
age Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 853 (2003) (noting that anti-immigration legislation 
was enacted in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, despite the fact that domestic terrorists 
were responsible); Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View from the Prairie: Harold Washington and the 
People of Illinois Respond to Federal Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285, 292 
(2005) (same); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multicul-
turalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1606-07 (1996) (same); Vu, supra note 56, at 677-79 (same); 
Whidden, supra note 56, at 2825-30 (same). 
58. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 109-12 (2001) (prohibiting 
discrimination against religious organizations in after-school use of school property); Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 511-17 (2000) (treating ancestry as proxy for race in prohibiting denial 
of voting rights to individuals who were not descendants of indigenous Hawaiians); Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-32 (1995) (prohibiting discrimination 
against religious organizations in use of student activity fees); cf Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (stating in dicta that Latino ethnicity could act as surrogate for race); 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (applying strict scrutiny to Japanese American exclusion order, but 
upholding exclusion order). 
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Race is now widely regarded by scientists as a concept that is so-
cially constructed, rather than a concept describing traits that are bio-
logically determined.59 Genetic variations between individuals of the 
same race exceed the genetic variations that exist between individuals 
of different races.60 Accordingly, the racial differences that we per-
ceive-as well as the cultural attributes that we attribute to those ra-
cial differences-are a function of little more than the social 
mythologies that we have created about race.61 Commentators have 
noted that race has been socially constructed in contemporary United 
States culture in a way that treats minority groups such as Arabs, Mid-
dle Easterners, South Asians, and Muslims as potentially disloyal, and 
therefore entitled to less constitutional protection than more main-
stream groups in the United States.62 Note that this social construc-
tion dovetails with the suggestions of disloyalty that are often leveled 
at opponents of the current Administration's counterterrorism 
policies.63 
The thing that is perhaps most important for present purposes is 
that we have constructed "race" to include Arabs, Muslims, and other 
"threatening" ethnic minorities because we have determined that 
members of those groups are sufficiently inferior to members of main-
stream United States culture that their liberty interests can be safely 
sacrificed to benefit the majority. That may superficially seem like an 
59. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PER· 
SPECTIVES 387-95 (2000) (discussing social construction of race). 
60. See id. at 388-89 (discussing genetic variations and citing Ian F. Haney L6pez, The So-
cial Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. 
c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 1, 3-7, 11-18,27-28,61-62 (1994». 
61. See id. at 391 (discussing social mythologies and citing Haney L6pez, supra note 60, at 
61-62). 
62. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the InteriNationallmagi-
nation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1399-1405 (1997) (arguing that non-white immigrants are treated 
as racial minorities entitled to less constitutional protection than members of the white major-
ity); Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1188-92 (1985) (suggesting that non-black "[o]ther non-[w]hites" are 
treated as a racial minority group entitled to less constitutional protection than members of the 
white majority); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and 
the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2002) (highlighting suspicions of disloyalty attached to non-white minorities); Kang, supra note 
56, at 195-97 (arguing that threats to national security cause United States culture to overesti-
mate the threats posed by non-white racial minorities, and to reduce the constitutional protec-
tion accorded those minorities); Arvin Lugay, Book Note,"ln Defense of Internment": Why 
Some Americans Are More "Equal" Than Others, 12 ASIAN L.J. 209, 210-12 (2005) (arguing that 
non-white immigrants are treated as a socially constructed racial minority and accorded reduced 
constitutional protection); Minami, supra note 42, at 38-39 (discussing surge in post-9t11 racial 
prejudice and violence against individuals of Middle Eastern or Muslim descent, and other racial 
minorities such as Sikhs mistakenly thought to be of Middle Eastern or Muslim descent); Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab 
Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1-3 (2001) (arguing that the World War II Japanese 
internment was not aberrational, and that the United States is presently repeating the same 
mistake by "racing" Arab Americans as "terrorists"); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575,1575-76 (2002) (arguing that post-9t11 United States culture treats indi-
viduals of Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim descent as racial minorities and accords them re-
duced respect and protection). 
63. See supra note 42 (discussing suggestions of disloyalty). 
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expedient counterterrorism strategy, but it is a strategy that poses 
profound risks. It risks exacerbating the cultural divisions that already 
exist in the United States in a way that might actually facilitate the 
destabilizing objectives of the terrorists.64 In addition, it risks under-
mining the coherence and integrity of the liberal equality values for 
which the United States claims to stand. Nevertheless, the strategy of 
sacrificing racial minority rights to advance majority interests is all too 
familiar a component of United States culture. 
B. Intrinsic Discrimination 
Liberals such as Professors Chemerinsky and Cole recognize that 
the war on terror entails a sacrifice of domestic liberty that is dispro-
portionately imposed on non-citizens who lack the political power to 
protect their own interests.65 Accordingly, they seek to remind both 
the courts and the players in the democratic process that a serious 
tension exists between such discriminatory treatment and the liberal 
equality values enshrined in the United States Constitution.66 How-
ever, because the discrimination that the war on terror promotes is a 
species of racial discrimination, I fear that it cannot be eliminated 
through recourse to liberal equality values. Racial discrimination is 
simply too intrinsic a component of United States culture to be mean-
ingfully displaced. It is firmly rooted in United States history, and 
Supreme Court judicial review has done more to promote than to pre-
vent its recurrence. 
1. History 
The history of the United States reveals a consistent and continu-
ing pattern of racial discrimination, pursuant to which the interests of 
64. Professor Heymann has argued that one of the greatest dangers of terrorism is that the 
target's counterterrorism responses will end up isolating disfavored groups from mainstream 
culture in the way that Ku Klux Klan terrorism facilitated the cultural isolation of blacks. Hey-
mann also stresses that terrorism is most likely to be effective in a culture that is already divided 
along racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. See HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA, 
supra note 4, at 2-3, 15-18 (discussing alienation and isolation); see also COLE, supra note 1, at 
193 (describing counterterrorism alienation that occurred in Northern Ireland). Perhaps one of 
the greatest dangers of terrorism is that it will solidify the very cultural divisions that will make 
future terrorist acts even more effective. 
65. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 2 (describing loss of domestic liberty); 
COLE, supra note 1 (same). 
66. Presumably, that is why Professors Chemerinsky and Cole have published articles and 
books about the deprivations of liberty occasioned by the war on terror. See supra note 1 (citing 
publications). Both have argued that the Bill of Rights prohibits many of the dual standards that 
are applied to justify distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. See Chemerinsky, supra 
note 1, at 2-3; COLE, supra note 1, at 211-33. Chemerinsky and Cole have also both represented 
plaintiffs in litigation seeking to invalidate liberty-restricting measures adopted by the Adminis-
tration as counterterrorism measures. See COLE, supra note 1, at 27-28, 76 (describing litigation 
in which Cole has participated); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foulston Siefkin Lecture at Washburn Uni-
versity School of Law: Civil Liberties and the War on Terror (Mar. 4, 2005), http://washburnlaw. 
edu/wlj/foulstonl2005chemerinskytranscript.php (describing litigation in which Chemerinsky has 
participated). 
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racial minorities have routinely been sacrificed for the benefit of the 
white majority. A brutal form of chattel slavery was introduced in the 
colonies even prior to the founding of the United States, as a means of 
promoting the economic interests of the white majority at the expense 
of black slaves.67 Rather than protecting the liberty interests of black 
slaves after the Nation was founded, the Constitution instead pro-
tected the institution of slavery.68 Prominent in the early history of 
the United States was the appropriation of Indian lands for the benefit 
of white settlers, followed by the genocide of Indian populations 
through armed combat and forced relocations.69 
After the Civil War, the white majority tried to protect United 
States citizens from foreign labor competition through the anti-immi-
gration provisions of the Chinese exclusion laws7°-a tactic that seems 
to have been reprised in the contemporary United States treatment of 
undocumented aliens.71 During the Reconstruction period, the gov-
ernment did little to prevent or punish the racial terrorism that ex-
pressed itself in the form of Ku Klux Klan violence and vigilante 
lynchings of blacks.72 And even after slavery and the subordinate sta-
tus of blacks were formally abolished by the post-Civil War Recon-
struction amendments, the Constitution was still interpreted to permit 
the maintenance of a regime of official segregation based on the racial 
inferiority of blacks?3 
In World War II, the United States chose to promote its national 
security interests through the now-infamous internment of Japanese 
American citizens, although it did not intern white citizens who shared 
67. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 85-89 (2d ed. 1985) (dis-
cussing harshness of United States chattel slavery); ORLANDO PATrERSON, SLAVERY AND SO· 
CIAL DEATH 94-97 (1982) (same). 
68. Article I, section 9, clause 1 prohibited Congress from abolishing the slave trade until 
1808, and it authorized the federal taxation of imported slaves. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
Article I, section 2, clause 3 apportioned seats in the House of Representatives on the basis of 
population, counting a slave as three-fifths of a white person. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
Article IV, section 2, clause 3 prohibited one state from according free status to slaves who had 
escaped from another state. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 508-09 (discussing harsh treatment of Indians). 
70. See id. at 509-10 (discussing Chinese exclusion laws). 
71. See George J. Borjas, Making It Worse: President Bush Has Tackled the Immigration 
Problem-Wrongly, NAT'L REV., Feb. 9, 2004, at 24, available at 2004 WLNR 17898865 (arguing 
that Bush Administration proposal to loosen restrictions on immigration is undesirable because 
it will increase labor competition); Greg Lucas, Sacramento; Border Security Debate Revived; 
Governor's Praise of Minutemen Leads to Talk of Costs, Benefits, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 2005, at 
Bl, available at 2005 WLNR 7696367 (discussing "Minutemen" private border patrols and effect 
of illegal immigration on competition for jobs and government services). 
72. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 352, 401, 506-07, 579-80 (discussing Ku Klux Klan and 
vigilante lynchings); see also Avis Thomas-Lester, A History Scarred by Lynchings; State Lives 
with a Legacy of Terror as Nation Pays Tribute to Victims' Descendants, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005 
(Va. Extra), at Tl, available at 2005 WLNR 11389519 (discussing recent Senate resolution apolo-
gizing for congressional failure ever to enact federal anti-lynching legislation). 
73. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1869) (upholding separate-but-equallaw); 
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 505-08 (discussing segregation). 
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ethnicity with the German and Italian enemies of the United States.74 
At the end of the war, the United States became the only nation in the 
world ever to use a nuclear weapon to kill another human being, and 
it has used nuclear weapons only against the JapaneseJ5 
Brown v. Board of Education76 is commonly said to have ushered 
in an era of racial equality in the United States by ending public 
school segregation and by prohibiting governmental use of racial clas-
sifications. However, Brown has not prohibited the widespread de 
facto segregation that exists throughout the United States,77 and it has 
not prohibited racial classifications in the form of racial profiling that 
has become a pillar of the war on terrorJ8 Rather, Brown spawned 
the ubiquitous colorblind, race-neutrality rhetoric that is now com-
monly invoked as the basis for contemporary constitutional attacks on 
racial affirmative action and remedial voting rights programsJ9 
The attitudes and effects of historical discrimination in the United 
States continue today. As previously noted, the Oklahoma City 
bombing was conducted by white terrorists, but it was followed by the 
reflex enactment of anti-immigration legislation directed at racial mi-
norities.80 Racial minorities remain disadvantaged in the allocation of 
all significant societal resources, including income, wealth, housing, 
education, employment, healthcare, and consumer goods.81 Blacks 
and other minorities are so disproportionately disadvantaged in the 
criminal justice system that commentators have posited the existence 
of separate criminal justice systems for whites and minorities, with mi-
norities bearing the costs of anti-crime initiatives that are thought to 
benefit whites.82 Other commentators have argued that racial minori-
74. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,215-20 (1944) (upholding exclusion order 
that led to internment of Japanese American citizens); id. at 239-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(discussing racial prejudice and exclusion order directed at Japanese Americans but not German 
or Italian Americans); FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 672 (referring to Karematsu and other deci-
sions as "blot" on reputation of Supreme Court). 
75. See SPANN, supra note 29, at 147-48 (discussing United States use of nuclear weapons). 
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
77. See SPANN, supra note 29, at 105-10 (discussing failure of Supreme Court to desegregate 
schools outside of the South). 
78. See supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing continued de facto use of ethnic profil-
ing in war on terror). 
79. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 156-89 (2000) [hereinafter SPANN, 
THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION] (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action and Voting 
Rights Act cases); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 
221-23 (2004) [hereinafter Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter] (tracing Supreme Court preference 
for colorblind race neutrality back to Brown); cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24, 327-
43 (2003) (recent case upholding educational affirmative action program giving holistic and indi-
vidualized consideration to applicants). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-76 (2003) 
(case decided same day as Grutter, invalidating educational affirmative action program as too 
mechanical to be narrowly tailored). 
80. See supra text accompanying note 57 (discussing Oklahoma City bombing). 
81. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing statistics showing disad-
vantages suffered by racial minorities). 
82. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-15 (1999) (describing dual criminal justice systems). 
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ties benefit in the United States only when such benefits happen to 
coincide with the conferral of benefits on whites.83 Racial discrimina-
tion has been so pervasive and persistent throughout the history of the 
United States that it seems to be an intrinsic feature of the culture. 
Both legal commentators and social cognition theorists have demon-
strated that significant amounts of racial prejudice continue to operate 
on an unconscious level throughout most of United States culture.84 
Racial discrimination is so firmly entrenched that it has simply be-
come second nature to assume that the interests of racial minorities 
should give way whenever necessary to advance the interests of the 
white majority. And somehow, the Constitution seems to tolerate this 
form of entrenched discrimination. 
2. Judicial Review 
In theory, judicial protection of individual rights should supple-
ment the democratic process in a way that prevents the sacrifice of 
racial minority rights for the benefit of the majority. Realistically, 
however, the supposed safeguard of judicial review has proved to be 
an ineffective remedy for the culture's intrinsic racial discrimination. 
Rather, the Supreme Court has typically interpreted the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and other antidiscrimination laws in a way that both 
promotes pervasive forms of societal discrimination, and protects ma-
jorities in their efforts to exploit minority rights. 
I have argued in the past that a largely unrecognized function of 
the Supreme Court has historically been to facilitate the exploitation 
of racial minority interests for the benefit of the white majority.85 It is 
noteworthy that the Supreme Court acquiesced in all of the 
majoritarian racial abuses discussed in the previous section of this arti-
cle-from protecting the institution of slavery to facilitating the World 
War II internment of Japanese American citizens.86 More recently, 
the Supreme Court spearheaded the current cultural backlash against 
affirmative action and remedial voting rights programs. Even when 
the majoritarian political process deemed it appropriate to provide 
83. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF 
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91-106 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). 
84. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1508-10 (2005) (dis-
cussing unconscious racial bias revealed by Implicit Association Test); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
317, 322-23 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimination is unconscious). 
85. See SPANN, supra note 29, at 1-6 (discussing "veiled majoritarian" function of Supreme 
Court). 
86. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing history of majoritarian exploitation of racial minority 
interests); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-20 (1944) (upholding World 
War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese American citizens); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 464-65 (1856) (invalidating congressional effort to limit spread 
of slavery and holding that blacks could not be "citizens" within meaning of United States 
Constitution). 
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race-conscious remedies for past discrimination, the Rehnquist Su-
preme Court typically held those efforts to be unconstitutiona1.87 Al-
though the Court did not seem particularly concerned with race 
neutrality while historically upholding efforts to discriminate against 
racial minorities, the Court now appears to be preoccupied with color-
blind race neutrality whenever race consciousness is used for remedial 
rather than discriminatory purposes.88 
There are structural reasons to doubt whether the Supreme Court 
could ever operate in a truly countermajoritarian manner. The Jus-
tices are socialized in an elite majoritarian culture, and legal doctrine 
is simply too indeterminate to insulate judicial decision-making from 
the socialized value preferences of the Justices.89 Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that Supreme Court judicial review has failed to pro-
vide a significant degree of protection against majoritarian incursions 
on minority rights, such as those that are presently being inflicted on 
racial minorities as part of the war on terror. However, the Supreme 
Court at times seems to be affirmatively going out of its way to per-
petuate the effects of racial discrimination. This is evident in the 
Court's tolerance for general societal discrimination and in its aver-
sion to racial balance. 
Curiously, the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions have 
made a point of holding that the Constitution prohibits the use of 
race-conscious remedies to address the low-level, institutionalized, 
everyday racial discrimination that has become an intrinsic aspect of 
United States culture. The Court refers to this as general "societal 
discrimination," and it seems to have adopted the position that minor-
ities must simply endure this sort of routine discrimination-through-
inertia, notwithstanding the Constitution's guarantee of equal protec-
tionYo Because the Court reads the Constitution to prohibit even 
majoritarian political efforts to eradicate this form of systemic dis-
87. See SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE AcrION, supra note 79, at 156-89 (discussing 
Supreme Court affirmative action and Voting Rights Act cases). 
88. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,326-27 (2003) (asserting preference for race 
neutrality); see also Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 79, at 223 (discussing Supreme 
Court preoccupation with colorblind race neutrality). 
89. See SPANN, supra note 29, at 19-82 (discussing inability of doctrine to constrain the exer-
cise of socialized judicial discretion). 
90. This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal discrimination, 
as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination, was articulated by Justice Lewis 
Powell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 
267,274-79 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). Led by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, this 
view has now been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Gruller, 539 U.S. at 
323-25 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying socie-
tal discrimination); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (majority opinion of Rehnquist, 
C.J.) (rejecting societal discrimination); see also Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 610-14 
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (same); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 
616,647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the jUdgment) (same); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 
(O'Connor, J. concurring) (same). See generally SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE AcrION, 
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crimination, the Court is actually constitutionalizing the level of intrin-
sic racial discrimination that exists in the culture at large. This is, 
sadly, reminiscent of cases like Dred Scott,91 and of the Constitution's 
affirmative safeguards for the intrinsic cultural practice of slavery 
when the Constitution was adopted.92 
Closely related to the Supreme Court's tolerance for societal dis-
crimination is its intolerance for efforts to achieve racial balance. The 
pursuit of racial balance in the allocation of resources such as jobs, 
educational opportunities, and voting strength seems to offer the most 
promising strategy for solving the persistent problem of intrinsic racial 
discrimination-a problem that the United States has been unable to 
solve in its 229-year history.93 Notwithstanding the failure of race-
neutral strategies to eradicate discrimination, the Supreme Court ada-
mantly insists that direct efforts to achieve racial balance are "patently 
unconstitutional" because they offend the Court's current fetish for 
colorblind race neutrality.94 Like its insensitivity to the problem of 
general societal discrimination, the Supreme Court's hostility to racial 
balance ends up simply freezing present inequalities in the allocation 
of resources that were produced by centuries of past discrimination. 
In so doing, the Supreme Court is itself guilty of perpetuating racial 
discrimination in a way that seems to violate any meaningful interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause.95 
Judicial review has proved an unreliable safeguard for the equal 
protection rights that the Constitution nominally accords racial minor-
ities. It is true that racial minorities sometimes secure sporadic victo-
ries before the Court.96 But those "victories" are best understood as 
palliatives whose primary function is to reduce some of the pressure 
generated by intrinsic cultural discrimination, so that this pressure 
does not rise to a high enough level to threaten a subcultural explo-
sion. The rhetorical value of judicial review undoubtedly helps the 
culture feel better about itself as the Supreme Court certifies that the 
supra note 79, at 168-69 (same); Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 79, at 229-31 
(discussing general societal discrimination). 
91. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 464-65 (invalidating congressional effort to limit 
spread of slavery, and holding that blacks could not be "citizens" within meaning of United 
States Constitution). 
92. See supra note 68 (enumerating constitutional provisions protecting slavery). 
93. See Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 79, at 239-42 (advocating conscious 
efforts to achieve racial balance). 
94. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (stating that pursuit of racial balance would be "patently 
unconstitutional"). 
95. See Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 79, at 222-23, 239 (arguing that Su-
preme Court rejection of racial balance in favor of colorblind race neutrality is itself a form of 
racial discrimination). 
96. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44 (upholding affirmative action plan); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (ordering desegregation of public schools). But see Spann, 
The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 79, at 229-31 (arguing that Grutter's insistence on color-
blind race neutrality will ultimately harm racial minorities); SPANN, supra note 29, at 105-10 
(arguing that Brown did not ultimately desegregate public schools outside of the South). 
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culture's intrinsic racial discrimination does not violate the Constitu-
tion. But like the racial discrimination that it is supposed to prevent, 
this model of judicial review amounts to little more than another way 
for the majority to advance its own interests by sacrificing the interests 
of racial minorities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States war on terror ends up inflicting the same sorts 
of liberty infringements on United States residents that the terrorists 
themselves are trying to inflict through the threat of terrorism. How-
ever, United States citizens will not have to internalize most of those 
liberty infringements, because they are being diverted primarily to 
Arab and Muslim foreign nationals. In this way, United States culture 
is treating those ethnic and religious minorities as racial minorities, 
and it is engaging in the same form of racial discrimination that has 
characterized United States race relations throughout the Nation's 
history. The interests of racial minorities are simply being sacrificed 
in order to advance the interests of the majority, in a way that has 
become an intrinsic feature of United States culture. 
Unfortunately, there is at least one other parallel between terror-
ism and the war on terror. Both inflict harms that seeIlYlikely to per-
sist into the indefinite future. The terrorist threat has now become 
such a routine part of everyday life throughout the world that it is 
difficult to imagine how the problem of terrorism realistically could 
ever be overcome. It may be a problem that we will simply have to 
learn to live with. Similarly, the practice of intrinsic racial discrimina-
tion remains such a routine part of everyday life in the United States 
that it is also difficult to see how that problem realistically could ever 
be overcome. It too appears to be a problem that we will simply have 
to learn to live with. Liberal efforts to remind the players in our polit-
ical and judicial processes of their constitutional obligations to guard 
against the abuses of racial subordination are noble efforts, but they 
seem unlikely to be any more successful now than they have been in 
the past. 
If there were a way for United States culture to evolve beyond its 
historically persistent sacrifice of minority rights for majoritarian gain, 
it would likely entail a new and more highly evolved understanding of 
the concept of racial equality. Although it is difficult to imagine what 
could prompt such an evolution, it is easy to imagine that such an 
evolution would begin with a recognition of the flaws in our present 
understanding of that concept. 
